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Art and Politics: Oscar Wilde's Critical Theory 
Masahide KANEDA 
"Don't let us discuss anything solemnly," says Gilbert in "The 
Critic as Artist." "I live in terror of not being misunderstood" (1114). 
Is this casual utterance only his affectation or is there any serious 
philosophy hidden behind its frivolousness? The passages in Oscar 
Wilde's works or his own utterances are almost always perplexing in 
this way. Whenever we face the wits and the paradoxes strewn in his 
works, we are forced to decode their intentions, yet their flippancy 
makes such an effort itself doubtful: we seek to know the serious 
intention while we are uncertain whether there is seriousness or a bit 
of intention. Despite its title, Intentions with this nature does not con-
vey Wilde's intention in a clear way, making the title partly ironic, 
though any intention can never be presE{nted directly, as Wilde 
himself suggests in this work. He recognises that his intention is 
produced through the interpellation between the letters on the pages 
and the readers, so that he gives the more privilege to the readers than 
to the authors. 
Indeed Wilde's intention in any sense evades our full understand-
ing. First of all, as the reactions of the contemporary reviewers record, 
this elusiveness is attributed to his style of the argument, the incon-
gruity between the form and the content. Observing that "the book is 
entertaining" full of paradoxes, Pall Mall Gazette says that "[h] e has 
written a fascinating, stimulating book, with more common sense in 
it than he would perhaps care to be accused of" (91-92); Athenaeum 
claims that "[i]n spite of his showy paradoxes, Mr. Wilde ... succeeds 
in proving that he has something to say" (92). As Danson summarises, 
most reviews seem to wish Wilde would get on with the thought itself 
"which is (they claim) as straightforward as the style is twisted" (20). 
This obvious gap between the form and the content makes it difficult 
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to decode the essays or even ascertain whether he is trifling with the 
thoughts. 
The incongruities detected in the various matters are also 
another salient cause to make Intentions elusive. The obviously self-
contradictory notions are put forth even within a single essay. For 
instance, as I shall show, he sees nature as what is created in a part 
while regarding it as determining and subjective in another; the impor-
tance of author's self-consciousness in the creation is pronounced 
whereas it is easily denied when the receivers are elevated to the only 
subjects to make the meanings. Pall Mall Gazette would be right when 
it observes that "consistency is the last virtue to which Mr. Wilde 
would dream of laying claim" (92). However, the inconsistency is one 
of the most important means for Wilde's critical thinking and it is only 
by investigating the contradictory notions that his critical theory can 
be understood to the full extent. This is because the inconsistency is 
what registers his seeking for the relationships between the critic/ 
artist and society and for the critical position to discern the social and 
ideological workings. 
Wilde's triviality itself which makes a gap is one method to 
destabilise the dichotomy between the trivial and the serious, risking 
the possibility that his proposition degrades into a mere entertainment. 
Thus what is needed to decode his critical theory is to discern the 
discourse upon which the inconsistent ideas converge, seeing at the 
same time his flippant style as the significant constituent of the con-
tent. Concentrating on the contradictory ideas and the salient styles 
with which they are put forth, I shall examine his notions as to art and 
the critic/artist with other important issues accumulating around them. 
His narrative reconstructed and deconstructed, it shall be revealed that 
Wilde's concern is exclusively political, art being always inscribed 
within the social sphere. 
Wilde's critical task dates from as early as his lecture tour of 
America in 1882, and there exist many reviews, all of which make him 
more multi-dimensional in a sense. Yet most of his critical writings 
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are the inquiries about the relations between art and society, and as to 
Intentions, the main themes of "The Decay of Lying" and "The Critic 
as Artist" are closely linked: what position do the critic/ artist hold to 
the social matters by using the aesthetic theory. Therefore I shall 
examine these two essays. This social aspect in two essays, however, 
is likely to be overlooked because they contain many impressive 
passages conveying at a glance the so-called aestheticism: "Art never 
expresses anything but itself" (1087); "All art is immoral" (1136); "the 
sphere of Art and the sphere of Ethics are absolutely distinct and 
separate" (1145). All these epigrammatic utterances by the spokesmen 
for Wilde, Vivian and Gilbert, indicate that art is superior to every-
thing and moreover it is autonomous. Indeed the one-sided view has 
made a history of the readings of the two essays with the help of the 
commonest notion of Wilde who, as a complete aesthete, proclaims art 
for art's sake and never lets society intervene in the aesthetic sphere. 
However, the truth is only that, because of their epigrammatic forms, 
those passages are cut from each context, and the aesthetic aspects 
they seem to have are too emphasised for them to have any social 
meanings. Wilde's notion of art always contains the social discourse 
beneath the aesthetic surface, and when he advocates the art for art's 
sake doctrine, it only means, as Eagleton says, "that the aesthetic 
should be kept free from the clutches of bourgeois morality" (338). 
Thus contrary to the concept of art as autonomous, he does insist upon 
its didactic function, exaggeratedly saying, for instance, that "Life is 
Art's best, Art's only pupil" (1083). Then what should be inspected is 
how he treats the political issues through the aesthetic arguments and 
how the contradictory ideas function in that narrative. 
The title Intentions in the plural is suggestive of such an 
incoherency, as it seems to imply that in each essay cannot be attained 
a single perspective, and it is intimated by the dialogue form the two 
essays take. The superiority of the form over the content is repeatedly 
claimed in "The Critic as Artist," in which Gilbert self-referentially 
says that the dialogue, the "wonderful literary form," has the advan-
tage of "giv[ing] form to every fancy, and reality to every mood"; "By 
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its means he [the thinker] can exhibit the object from each point of 
view, and show it to us in the round" (1143) _ l) Thus the dialogue form 
can make its content multiple and, as Gagnier says, "dialogical" in the 
Bakhtinian sense (32). The fact that Wilde uses this form knowing its 
multiple nature denotes that the essays are intended to be full of con-
tradictions and open to the diverse interpretations. 
This proposition that a single perspective is never attained is one 
of the important issues Wilde poses in "The Critic of Artist." He fully 
recognises the uncertainty in the signification, so he puts himself in 
the plays of the signs as if he took pleasure in wandering there. In 
these plays language is the most attractive object, so that art is often 
equivalent to it in his concept. Therefore the Greek is highly praised 
for "the fact that the material they criticised with most care was ... 
language"; Words have not merely music, colour, and plastic form, 
"but thought and passion and spirituality are theirs also, are theirs 
indeed alone" (1117). The idea of language as having no single fixed 
meaning is transmuted to the assumption that the artistic works also 
undergo the diverse receptions: "it is rather the beholder who lends to 
the beautiful thing its myriad meanings, and makes it marvellous for 
us, and sets it in some new relation to the age" (1127). The idea of the 
superiority of the critic over the artist is developed in this view, and 
the germs of what is called the creative criticism as well as the 
reader-response theory are found here.2) Yet he does not give the 
limitless privilege for the readers, as Giibert says that "[a] ll artistic 
creation is absolutely subjective" and "that the more objective a crea-
tion appears to be, the more subjective it really is" (1142). Thus Wilde 
does not completely reject the author's participation in making the 
meanings. Yet what is recognised in this incongruity is his awareness 
of the performativity of the things: art with the linguistic nature is 
arbitrarily interpreted with the various factors around it, which might 
be the relatively external elements such as mood, tone, or context 
which are derived from the (implied) author's as well as the text's 
subjective interpellation. The cognizance of the performativity in art 
corresponds to the notion of the superiority of the form over the 
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content. Although, as San Juan says, Wilde "never completely ignores 
subject matter" (88), 3) for him the form is what leads the content and 
never vice versa: Gilbert states that "the real artist is he who proceeds, 
not from feeling to form, but from form to thought and passion .... He 
gains his inspiration from form, and from form purely, as an artist 
should" (1148). Realising the form has the power to control the 
content, Wilde adopts the linguistic manoeuvres such as epigrams, 
paradoxes, and inversions, which means that his style itself is an essen-
tial part of the content it conveys. The critical nature of the Wildean 
language recognised in this way, to speculate what is working behind 
this method would be profitable, for if language is often equivalent to 
art for him, the course the linguistic subversion of the common sense 
takes crosses over the antagonism between art and nature or life 
discussed in "The Decay of Lying." 
Epigrams, paradoxes, and inversions are all in essence the 
linguistic rebellions against the conventional thinking. As Eagleton 
succinctly says, "the epigram is the mind's momentary triumph over 
the dead matter of conventional wisdom, a piece of linguistic deviancy, 
a sagacious saying gone suddenly awry" (334). Significant here is that 
the convention in its usual sense is what has been made by repetition 
and imitation, and Wilde's excessive involvement with the linguistic 
plays obviously derives from his strong aversion to this sort of 
repetition. One of the main themes of "The Decay of Lying" is the 
rejection of realism or naturalism, as Vivian declares that "[a] s a 
method, realism is a complete failure" (1080), and this anti-realism 
takes the form of anti-nature and anti-life, and contrarily it leads to 
the promotion of lying as the imaginative art. The binary opposition 
established here is relatively in order: realism, nature, and life all 
belong to the sordid facts and truth-telling whereas lying, "the telling 
of beautiful untrue things" (1091), and art are fictitious and imagina-
tive. The most famous phrases that "Life imitates Art far more than 
Art imitates Life" (1082) and "Nature also imitates Art" (1091) are 
also reliant on this binary structure, and the most crucial factor in this 
division is that between the imitative and the imaginative: realism is 
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detestable in that it imitates blindly the facts, with the "substitution of 
an imitative for a creative medium, [the] surrender of an imaginative 
form" (1079); Nature is always behind the age, for "people only dis-
covers in her what they bring to her" (1078); as to life, it "holds the 
mirror up to Art, and either reproduces some strange type imagined by 
painter or sculptor, or realises in fact what has been dreamed in 
fiction" (1086). 
"Nature imitates Art." This is indeed not a paradox nor perver-
sion when read in the essay's proper narrative. Although the passage 
has often been interpreted as the ultimate claim for art, what Vivian 
propagates is the axiom that nature is never natural in itself as culture 
conditions what it is. Wilde persists in the word art, but it can be 
changed with language in general as before or culture as the ideologi-
cal and linguistic way of thinking. Vivian's explanation is quite 
reasonable: "Nature is no great mother who has borne us. She is our 
creation. It is our brain that she quickens to life" (1086). Thus the 
passage, disclosing that nature is made up through the linguistic 
enactment, has within it the strong political concern to transform 
society: if nature which is regarded as inevitable is the imitation in 
that it blindly reflects the ideological orders, nature as well as other 
social artifacts can be displaced from the seemingly fixed position, 
society being radically transformed. As Dollimore says, "Wilde is a 
proto-structuralist" (11) in this sense. 
The medium he sees as significant for this transformation is the 
imagination: it "is essentially creative, and always seeks for a new 
form" (1083) and "[t]he moment Art surrenders its imaginative 
medium it surrenders everything" (1091). Just as nature is degraded as 
the imitative creation, life is in the same way regarded as the mimic of 
the imaginative art. "Life imitate Art" is either not so perverse as it 
appears to be, which has again the highly political connotation. Al-
though the examples Vivian tells of this matter are insignificant as if 
they were the practices of lying, the general principle he expounds is 
pertinent: "Scientifically speaking, the basis of life ... is simply the 
desire for expression, and Art is always presenting various forms 
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through which the expression can be attained. Life seizes on them and 
uses them" (1085). Art is again tantamount to language, and from the 
linguistic point of view, this logic denotes that the signifiers precede 
the signifieds, as Gilbert regards language as "the parent, not the child, 
of thought" (1121). Life which is the social phenomena in general is 
exposed as nothing but the fictitious production in that it only imitates 
the fiction without any origin nor the Platonic idea. This is the true 
meaning of the sentence that "[a] ll bad art comes from returning to 
Life and Nature, and elevating them into ideals" (1091), all bad art 
corresponding to the deficient society which imitates the prior acts 
repeatedly without any critical spirit. 
That one must have this kind of critical spirit in order to recog-
nise the naturalised workings of the ideologies and learn "the best that 
is known and thought in the world" (1138) is the subject discussed in 
"The Critic as Artist." Focusing upon the creativity which is born of 
the imaginative faculty, in this essay is claimed the superiority of the 
critic over the artist and the criticism over the artistic work itself. 
As is broadly acknowledged, this seemingly inverted proposition is 
affected by Arnold's and Pater's critical thoughts. The original title, 
"The True Function and Value of Criticism; with some Remarks on 
the Importance of Doing Nothing: a Dialogue" clearly echoes Arnold's 
title. According to Arnold, the creative faculty can be used as the part 
of the critical power, and by criticism one can make progress and 
"create a current of true and fresh ideas" (20). Wilde follows this 
proposition in his own essay. However, "to see the object as in itself it 
really is" is rejected by Gilbert, who declares that it is "a very serious 
error, and takes no cognizance of Criticism's most perfect form, which 
is in its essence purely subjective" (1126), which has more echoes 
from Pater, who has emended the Arnoldean disinterestedness in the 
preface to The Renaissance, observing "in aesthetic criticism the first 
step towards seeing one's object as it really is, is to know one's own 
impression as it really is" (xix). Yet Gilbert's revision of Pater goes 
further to extremes of subjective impressionism: "the Highest 
Criticism, being the purest form of personal impression, is in its way 
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more creative than creation, as it has least reference to any standard 
external to itself" (1125). Now to the criticism is attached the more 
creative faculty than to the artistic work, and as far as the creativity 
is concerned, the subjective is naturally more important than the 
objective; Therefore, in this idea some arts are considered to be a little 
lower because "[t]he mere creative instinct does not innovate, but 
reproduces" (1120), that is, it is not subjectively creative but objec-
tively imitative. When the opposition between the imitative and the 
creative is implicitly evoked in this way, the criticism naturally gets 
more significance. However, if the critic is regarded as a kind of artist, 
the artist is also fully recognised as critic, as "artistic creation implies 
the working of the critical faculty, and, indeed, without it cannot be 
said to exist at all" (1124). Then it is one and the same creative 
faculty that what is required for both the artist and the critic. Even if 
the critic is in a certain condition superior to the artist in the subjec-
tive purity, the artist is equally significant in that he is manipulating 
the creative hence critical faculty. 
Only with this critical faculty can both the critic as artist and the 
artist as critic recognise the political problems in general. Social 
matters are the very objects of the critic, as Gilbert praises the Greeks 
for having exercised the critical spirit on questions of "the two 
supreme and highest arts," that is "life and the perfect expression of 
life" (1114). The critical attitude towards the social affairs is revealed 
especially when Wilde's essay has much likeness to Arnold's: as Kohl 
puts it, their antagonism "against a materialistic, utilitarian view of 
life" (102); the worldwide standpoint, whieh Arnold says "regards 
Europe as being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great con-
federation, bound to a joint action and working to a common result" 
(33), which in Wilde's view gives rise to "the peace that springs from 
understanding" (1153); and above all, Arnold's prospect of doing "most 
good to his readers" by "communicating fresh knowledge, and letting 
his own judgement pass along with it" (32), which is explained by 
Wilde as the critic's concern with the age, "which he will seek to wake 
into consciousness, and to make responsive creating in it new desires 
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and appetites, and lending it his larger vision and the nobler moods" 
(1149). Contrary to the propaganda for art for art's sake, "The Critic 
as Artist" thus proposes the transformative power the critic and the 
artist hold. The critical faculty born of the creative imagination makes 
it possible to detect the social fissures, rejecting the acts the ideologies 
demand to repeat in order to make them appear natural. The critic 
and the artist are, as Price maintains, "not isolated from the political 
and social problems of the time, but directly involved within them" 
(116). 
If this is Wilde's attitude per se, however, the importance of the 
contemplation against the action Gilbert proposes seem incoherent, 
for this principle seems to register the countercurrent rejecting the 
political involvement. That he refuses the action preferring the con-
templation and the (effeminate) artistic world seems the most casual 
explanation, but this is tainted with the predilection for seeing him as 
an aesthete. His aesthetic attitudes always contain implicitly or 
explicitly the criticism of the ideological workings. Then to examine 
what is at stake in this seeming incongruity would serve to illuminate 
Wilde's complicated critical idea. 
He exposes nature as an ideological fiction in that it is created in 
our brain, whereby he can take a critical position to displace what is 
called natural: if it is an arbitrary product, it can be easily transformed 
and with it is also disclosed the ideological workings insidiously mak-
ing the nature what it is. In this way the effect of his criticism depends 
upon the concept of nature as an artifact. However this deconstructive 
measure goes halfway, for the notion of nature as innate hence 
determining obsesses him, which engenders the inconsistent ideas. 
Nature as determining, for instance, comes to the surface when Vivian 
personifies it, saying "Nature has good intentions," though he soon 
puts forth the opposing view, claiming the infinite variety of nature 
"resides in the imagination" (1071). Thus the antithetical views of 
nature exist in the essays.4l The concept of nature as determining 
is brought about by the notions as to heredity and the inevitable 
natural selection, which affect the argument of the action and the con-
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templation. Gilbert explains: action "is a blind thing dependent on 
external influences, and moved by an impulse of whose nature it is 
unconscious .... Its basis is the lack of imagination" (1121). Although 
the term used is "external," the idea of action as determined is con-
cerned with internal heredity. Thus he later expounds: The scientific 
principle of heredity "has shown us that we are never less free than 
when we try to act. It has hemmed us round with the nets of the 
hunter, and written upon the wall the prophecy of our doom. We may 
not watch it, for it is within us" (1137). If the action is determined and 
we cannot but repeatedly follow the programmes heredity as the 
innate nature constitutes, there would be no chance to take a critical 
standpoint. This is why Wilde rejects the action and instead insists 
upon the contemplation. Thus it is not the escape from the political 
involvement but, quite contrarily, the positive participation in it that 
brings about this proclamation. As Gilbert's argument shows, the 
imagination is set forth against the action, and the opposition between 
the creative and the repetitive is again what separates them. However, 
surprisingly, too much obsession with the principle of heredity makes 
Gilbert declare that "the imagination is the result of heredity" (1138). 
If this is the case, the imagination, losing the creative capacity, 
degrades into the repetitive agent. To prevent this degeneration, Wilde 
takes advantage of the multiplicity heredity promises: the principle of 
heredity in the case of imaginative sphere "can help us to leave the 
age in which we were born, and to pass into other ages, and find 
ourselves not exiled from their air. It can teach us how to escape from 
our experience, and realise the experiences of those who are greater 
than we are." The assumption is that by imagination which "is simply 
concentrated race-experience" can one live the multiple lives, and it is 
the true critic "who lives with those who are the Immortals" that can 
make perfect "this culture that this transmission of racial experiences 
makes possible" (1138). In this way, whereas in the sphere of action 
heredity is the burden to trap us in the determinism where we are the 
object of its workings, in that of imagination it is the medium to lead 
to the multiplicity and the indeterminacy through which we can have 
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If this subjective position is important for the criticism, it is the 
multiplicity of imagination itself that is equally essential to be critical, 
which is transmuted into the support of the multiplicity and the 
indeterminacy in the self: "we are never more true to ourselves than 
when we are inconsistent" (1142); and as to the true critic, "through 
constant change alone, he will find his true unity. . . . The essence of 
thought, as the essence of life, is growth" (1144-1145). This claim is 
obviously political, as the diverse imaginations as race-experiences are 
what "will annihilate race-prejudices, by insisting upon the unity of the 
human mind in the variety of its forms" (1153). 
This inconsistent self in the indeterminacy, however, seems a 
little ambiguous because how and when one can be critical in such a 
state is unknown. Yet this is what characterises Wilde's political 
measure, the attitude to reject any authority and authenticity to the 
extent that his own view loses them: destabilising his own standpoint 
with its frivolous style and the incongruities, he subjects himself to 
the multiple views and the plays of the signs. This is the very reason 
Wilde's ideas are always elusive. The inconsistency which promises the 
progress, subverting the logocentric base, is, as Danson observes, "a 
challenge to common assumptions about the sources and production of 
meaning" (20). It is certain that the critic/ artist seem to take plea-
sure in that indeterminacy, yet it is not pleasure for pleasure's sake 
but to be forever creative hence critical without any final view that 
this radical indeterminacy functions. It is the political concern that 
stimulates the critic I artist to be inconsistent and growing. 
The dialogue form of the two essays coupled with the flippant 
style sets up the basic ground where the diverse views can be con-
tested. Besides, the form which embeds the articles within them with 
many descriptions and digressions renders them multiple and in-
consistent, the form being foregrounded as the part of the content. 
Then the appropriate name for their genre would be theory in that, as 
Culler argues, "theory is itself the questioning of presumed results and 
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the assumptions on which they are based" (17). Moreover, taking into 
account the essays' positive seeking for the indeterminate dynamics, 
they are the practice of the deconstructive procedure in its proper 
sense, as deconstruction, Miller observes, "attempts to resist its own 
tendencies to come to rest in some sense of mastery over the work" 
(252), the work here meaning the social and linguistic network as 
text. The function of the true critic/ artist is to be critical forever. As 
Gilbert declares: "It is Criticism that, recognising no position as final, 
and refusing to bind itself by the shallow shibboleths of any sect or 
school, creates that serene philosophic temper which loves truth for its 
own sake, and loves it not the less because it knows it to be 
unattainable" (1153). Although this truth for its own sake as well as 
art for art's sake seems to indicate the autonomy of thought and art, 
this is never their meaning; on the contrary the proposition is that 
thought and art are where the imaginative and creative faculty works, 
with which alone can one have the critical viewpoints, rejecting the 
social repetition the ideologies demand. Wilde's aesthetic doctrine 
always contains the discourse of the social transformation, so the 
famous inverted passage, "No great artist ever sees things as they 
really are" (1088) is indeed recognised as the manifestation of the 
artist's critical function in society. 
Most of the inconsistent ideas are caused by Wilde's notion of the 
growth which can be made possible only through the everlasting 
questioning. He puts forth an idea while deliberately or not negating 
it, inhabiting the indeterminate space. As a result, what the essays 
present i~ at once the insistence on the significance of incongruity and 
the practice of it, the form being the part of the content. For the 
development of society, the critical views are essential, which can be 
attained only by the multiple imaginations. The inconsistent self 
engendered in this logic denotes Wilde's political concern, and the 
essays register his struggle for the wide views to be critical. Having 
the imaginative and creative faculty, the critic I artist are the only 
agents qualified for those critical positions, whence they can see "the 
dawn before the rest of the world" (1155). 
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Notes 
1) This idea is taken from Chuang Tsu, as Wilde explains in a review 
quoting the saga's words that "he adopts dialogue as his mode of 
expression ... 'in order to gain breadth of view"' (227). 
2) The affinity between Wilde's creative criticism and the contempo-
rary literary criticisms is fully acknowledged and Longxi's list 
includes the great critics such as Wimsatt and Beardsley, Frye, 
Barthes, Said, Bloom, and Hartman. 
3) Vivian rejects not only the form but the content of naturalism, 
saying "modernity of form and modernity of subject-matter are 
entirely and absolutely wrong" (1077). 
4) These antithetical views engender the opposition between the 
essentialism and the anti-essentialism. Although most of Wilde's 
ideas are established on the latter as maintained by Dollimore, the 
former can be seen, as Price observes that he is "an essentialist 
who believes in a human nature" (7). Yet as far as the critical 
method i,s concerned, his is anti-essentialism, and the essentialism 
surfaces almost only when his notion tends towards the optimistic 
natural selection. The problem as to the aesthetic democracy and 
the individualism is related with this matter, of which Dowling's 
argument is informative, 89-100. 
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